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Is the gender wage gap declining in the Netherlands?
1 Introduction
Since the mid nineteen eighties several labour market differences between men and women 
in the Netherlands have been declining. First of all women have increased their labour 
market participation enormously, whereas the participation of men only slightly increased. 
Between 1985 and 2003 women’s participation increased from 30 per cent to 55 per cent, 
whereas men’s participation rate increased only from 65 to 75 per cent. A large part of the 
increase in women’s participation rate can be explained by the huge increase in part-time 
jobs in the Netherlands (Visser and Hemerijck, 1997; Wielers and Van der Meer, 2003). 
Another part of their increase can be explained by the rise in their educational attainment 
(Wielers and Van der Meer, 1998). Besides the declining difference in labour market 
participation, the job levels of men and women became more equal (Van der Meer, 2005). 
It even appears that in 2000 young women have higher job levels than young men, 
thereby overtaking men for the first time. This is explained by their advantage in educational 
attainment, which is for young women higher than for young men. Although female workers 
now have the same or even higher educational attainments as male workers do, the 
differences in overeducation have declined too. Women were in the early nineties more often 
overeducated than men; in 2000 this difference almost disappeared. Women’s job level rose 
much faster than their educational level, whereas men’s job level lagged behind their 
educational attainment. So on different aspects gender differences on the Dutch labour 
market declined. 
However, it is less well known what happened to the gender wage gap in the 
Netherlands. There is some evidence that this wage gap is declining too, but systematic 
evidence is missing  (Fouarge et al., 2004; Portegijs et al., 2002). Although some researchers 
published about the Dutch gender wage gap (i.e. Bakker et al., 1999; De Ruijter et al., 2003; 
Schippers, 1987) systematic research into the trend, over a longer period, in this wage gap is 
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2
missing. Therefore the aim of this paper is to describe and explain the trend in the Dutch 
gender wage gap between 1985 and 1998. The main question I seek to answer is: can the 
trend in the Dutch gender wage gap be explained by the decreasing gap in labour market 
participation between men and women in the Netherlands?
Several explanations will be put forward and tested. Some explanations rely or 
elaborate on human capital theory and other rational choice theories. Other explanations 
refer directly to the source of discrimination, like Becker’s ‘taste’ for discrimination
(Becker, 1957) or statistical discrimination.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses explanations of the 
gender wage gap and how the trend might be affected. In section three I describe the 
decomposition methods and estimation techniques that are used to test the hypotheses. I also 
describe the OSA labour supply panel, which is the data source for the trend in the wage 
gap.  The fourth section contains the main results and section five summarizes and concludes 
the paper. 
Contrary to my expectation I did not find a decreasing gender wage gap in the 
Netherlands. Neither the gross wage gap nor the unexplained wage gap decreased between 
1985 and 1998. Only a small proportion of the gross wage gap is explained by productivity 
differences between men and women.
2 Explaining the gender wage gap
Much has been written about labour market differences between men and women. In essence 
two types of theories coexist. First some theories try to explain labour market behaviour of 
men and women. These theories are useful in explaining the supply side of the labour market 
and can explain why women less often have jobs, work fewer hours than men do or 
experience different wage elasticity. A prominent example of this strand of research is the 
model of the division of labour in households and families by Becker (1993).
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According to Becker (1993) women tend to invest less and in different types of human 
capital than men do. The reasoning is as follows: because women expect to participate less 
on the labour market than men, they will invest less in schooling. The expected lower 
participation is explained by biological differences. Women expect to bear and raise 
children, which reduces their time, spend on the labour market. Their careers might be 
interrupted or a full-time job might be exchanged for a part-time job. Because women expect 
to spend less time on the labour market than men, they will invest less in human capital, 
because the income gain from the investment will be lower. They expect to have lower 
revenues, which makes an investment less worthwhile. This difference in investment 
behaviour not only results in a lower educational attainment, but also in less on-the-job 
training and less investment in firm-specific human capital. 
Because women expect to interrupt their career they are less likely than men to invest 
in firm-specific human capital that only starts to pay off after several years, that is just when 
they want to interrupt their labour market career. The difference in on- the-job training and 
firm-specific human capital should result in a less steep age-earning profile for women than 
for men. In a cross-sectional analysis this might show as higher wages, cet. par., for young 
women and lower wages for older women, cet. par., than for men.
Given the increasing educational attainment of women and specially the decreasing 
difference in educational attainment between men and women in the Netherlands it is to be 
expected that the gross gender wage gap has declined in the last decade. Naturally this also 
depends on other productive characteristics like labour market experience, but cet. par. it 
should hold. Also given the increasing participation of Dutch women on the labour market 
the difference in labour market experience might have declined too, supporting the 
hypothesis that the gross gender wage gap has declined.
With these models the division of labour is explained, given the wages that can be 
earned on the labour market. Of course these wages depend on human capital. However 
these models do not explain why wages differ between men and women, given the same 
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supply characteristics. Men and women are perfect substitutes on the labour market and 
should therefore earn equal wages, given their productive characteristics. This is so because 
on a competitive labour market wages equal marginal productivity and in equilibrium equal 
productive labour will be paid the same wage.
From many empirical studies (i.e. Blau and Kahn, 2000 and others), it is known that 
wages between men and women differ even if one controls for productivity differences. This 
difference is called the gender wage gap and is explained by theories of discrimination. In 
essence the argument is, because women are discriminated against women earn lower wages 
than men. An excellent example of such a theory is Becker’s idea of a ‘taste’ for 
discrimination (Becker, 1957). Because employers, colleagues and or customers prefer not 
to be in contact with a minority group, the minority group has to compensate the employers, 
colleagues or customers, by accepting lower wages. The employer who has a preference for 
a particular group of workers has to be compensated for hiring workers from these groups to 
attain the same level of utility as an employer who has no particular preference. 
In a static world this model explains why wages differ between otherwise equal 
groups of workers, be it men or women or whites and blacks or Hispanic. Given this model 
the gross wage gap can be decomposed in a productivity difference and a discrimination 
effect (Oaxaca, 1973). However, in a more dynamic world the model of Becker does not 
hold, or stated more precisely, the wage differences caused by a ‘taste’ for discrimination 
should whither away, or the labour market will be completely segregated. This is so because 
non-discriminating employers are able to hire the minority workers against slightly higher 
wage than the discriminating employer is likely to pay. The minority workers are still paid 
below there productivity so employers will still have a profit. In this way the discriminating 
employer will loose all the minority workers and ends up with an expensive labour force, 
making less profit than the non-discriminating employer. In the end the non-discriminating 
employer will out-compete the discriminating employer and the discriminating differences 
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in wages will have gone away. All wage differences can then be explained by productivity 
differences between groups of workers (Schippers, 1987).
Another possible outcome of the model is a complete segregation of workers between 
employers or between departments of organizations. So if the model of Becker holds one 
would expect a steady decline in the gender wage gap.  That is, one would expect that the 
unexplained differences in wages would decline. Due to productivity differences gross 
wages might still differ between men and women. This is exactly what has been found in the 
United States of America (Blau, 1998; Blau and Kahn, 2000; Durden and Gaynor, 2000), 
The United Kingdom (Manning, 2004) , Hong Kong (Fan, 2003) and Australia (Preston, 
2003). Also the sparse evidence for the Netherlands suggests a decline in the gender wage 
gap, as stated in the introduction.
Due to institutional changes in the Netherlands, i.e. privatization and deregulation, 
both the product market and the labour market have become more competitive. Because of 
this increased competitiveness it should have become more difficult for an employer who 
has a ‘taste’ for discrimination to survive. So it is to be expected that the unexplained gender 
wage gap has become smaller in the Netherlands.
Besides this theory of direct discrimination, other theories seek to explain the gender 
wage gap by imperfections on the labour market. Neoclassical economic theory predicts that 
in a competitive market wages will equalize. Because the labour market is not as competitive 
as the theory supposes, there is room to pay otherwise equal workers different wages. One of 
the first to recognize this was John Stuart Mill (Mill, 1849) with his idea of non-competing 
groups. The non-competing groups could result in a crowding of women in a small segment 
of the labour market reducing their wages to a lower level than men’s wages (Bergmann, 
1974). The supply of women is relatively more concentrated than that of men, which reduces 
their wages. This concentration might be driven by the division of labour in the household, 
which let women invest in human capital that is less profitable on the labour market than 
that of men. Although the crowding hypothesis is not confirmed for the Netherlands (De 
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6
Ruijter et al., 2003) we will take account of this effect. The increased labour market 
participation of women could have strengthened the crowding effect.
A further prominent model of explaining discrimination is by means of statistical 
discrimination. This model is based on the idea that it is difficult to measure the productivity 
of workers (Arrow, 1972). In the hiring process the employer bases the decision on past 
experience. Because the knowledge about the productivity of the majority is more precise 
than that of the minority group, workers form the majority group receive more and better 
wage offers than workers from the minority group (Bielby and Baron, 1986). This results in 
tougher hiring criteria for the minority group and will lower their wages compared to the 
workers from the majority group. 
Because the participation rate of women increased drastically in the Netherlands the 
last decade or so, it is difficult to sustain that those women are a small minority group on the 
labour market. At least not such a small minority group that statistical discrimination is 
warranted. So, because of this increase in labour market participation of women it is to be 
expected that the unexplained gender wage gap has declined. 
There is yet another reason why I can expect that the gender wage gap should have 
declined in the Netherlands. It is well known that labour supply of women is more elastic 
than the labour supply of men. Women change their labour market behaviour, the number of 
hours worked and the decision to participate, much more in reaction to changes in wages 
than men do. Whereas women tend to increase labour market participation and hours worked 
when wages increase, men do not change their labour market behaviour or even work less. 
This last phenomenon is known as the backward bending supply curve (Bosworth et al., 
1996). As far as known this results also hold for the labour market behaviour of Dutch men 
and women (Van der Lippe, 1993). So the increase in labour market participation of women 
in the Netherlands the last decade suggests that wages for women have increased and that 
the gender wage gap has decreased too. Of course, this last conclusion also depends on the 
change in men’s wage rate. 
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7
All in all I have enough arguments to expect a drop in the Dutch gender wage gap. 
After considering all theories but one expect the gender wage gap to drop. If the wage gap 
indeed did fall that I will study in the next sections.
3 Method and data
Measuring wage differentials can be done in different ways. First of all one should calculate 
the gross or unadjusted wage differentials (Gwf). This can simply be done by:
(1)
Where Wm is the hourly wage of the men and Wf the hourly wage of the women. Taking the 
logarithms results in:
(2)
This returns the wage gap in log points that I will present in the next sections. This wage 
differential is gross because it does not adjust for productivity differences between men and 
women. One method to calculate this difference is to regress ln(wage) on a gender dummy. 
To adjust for productivity differences one can simply add more variables, like education, 
experience and others, in the regression equation. If these variables (or productivity 
differences) explain the wage difference between men and women than the effect of the 
gender dummy variable will become smaller and even insignificant. Some use this measure 
as the adjusted wage gap. Therefore I will present these adjusted differentials along the 
unadjusted.
To gain more insight into the gender wage gap it is possible to estimate separately 
wage equations for men and women and use these equations to decompose the gross 
1= WWG fmwf
)ln()ln()1ln( WWG fmwf =+
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differential. It becomes visible how much of the wage gap can be explained by productivity 
differences between men and women and how much can be explained by an overpayment of 
men or underpayment of women. Decomposition along these lines were developed by 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Their decomposition is as follows:
(3)
The first term on the right hand side represents the contribution of productivity differences 
between men and women and the second term is a price effect. The problem with this 
decomposition is that one can use both the men’s and women’s equation as the basis of 
comparison and that both decompositions can give different answers. Researchers therefore 
proposed that the comparison should be made with the ‘true’ wage equation, i.e. the 
parameters of the wage equation in absence of discrimination. This ‘true’ wage equation 
should lie somewhere in between the wage equations of men and women. To estimate this 
‘true’ wage equation the parameters should be weighted. The question then is which weights 
should be used. The parameters can be calculated as the mean of the men’s and women’s 
parameters; both having equal weights, or could be weighted by the proportions of men and 
women in the labour force. Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) propose a weighing scheme in which 
the precision of the parameter estimates act as weight. Parameters with relatively low 
variation are given more weight than parameters with more variation. The Oaxaca and 
Ransom decomposition is as follows:
(4)
The first term on the right-hand side represents the overpayment of men, the second term the 
underpayment of women and the third term the productivity difference. In this equation 
* represents the ‘true’ parameter in absence of discrimination and is calculated as:
)()()1ln( ˆˆˆ  fmffmmwf xxxG +=+
*** )'()(')(')1ln(  fmffmmmf XXXXG ++=+
))
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(5)
Because I start with Becker’s discrimination model (Becker, 1957) which states that 
employers do not only care about profits but also about the gender composition of the 
workforce it is natural to use the Oaxaca decomposition that is derived from this model. 
The wage equations can be estimated with OLS-regression on cross-section data. Because I 
have panel data at my disposal I can estimate the wage equation using panel techniques. 
These techniques can deal with unobserved heterogeneity that cannot be dealt with in cross-
section analyses. Correcting for unobserved heterogeneity improves the estimates of the 
parameters. So besides the cross-section analyses I estimate the following wage equation on 
panel data and use it in the decomposition:
(6)
In which µ is an overall constant, i is an individual specific random effect controlling for 
the unobserved heterogeneity, t a time specific random effect controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity over time, and it an error term that varies both over individuals and over time. 
Equation 6 is estimated using a random effects model and contains both time-variant and 
time-invariant variables.
The data stem from the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA). Every two-year 
they hold a panel survey among a random selection of the Dutch population. The first survey 
was held in March 1985, the second one in September 1986 and since then biennially. I have 
access to the surveys held in 1985, 1986, 1988, 1994, 1996 and 1998. The two in between 
surveys lack necessary information on the current job and therefore cannot be used.
In the cross-sectional analyses I used the information of everyone being in paid 
employment and of whom all information is available. The number of cases varies between 
])var()[var(])var()[var( 11111* ffmmfm 
))))))  ++=
ittiitit xW µ ++++= ')ln(
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1688 and 2447. This variation is mainly due to the increase in labour market participation 
over the years and not by an increase in the sample. For the panel analyses I use only those 
persons who were in paid employment in at least two cross-sections. Persons who joined the 
survey only once are left out because they hardly contribute to the panel estimates. 
In 1985 I have 1779 persons; in 1986 1780, in 1988 1688, in 1994 2292, in 1996 2447
and in 1998 2323 persons. In the panel analysis I have in total 8590 observations of 3208
individuals. Besides estimating the panel model over the whole period I also analysed 1985, 
1986 and 1998 as one panel and 1994, 1996 and 1998 as a second panel. This gives me two 
estimates of the gender wage gap controlled for unobserved heterogeneity and I can test if 
the gender wage gap has declined. In these last two models I used a one-factor random 
effects model, leaving out t  the time specific random coefficient.
The variables contained in the analyses are: the log (real after tax hourly wage), 
educational level, job level, total labour market experience and its square, years at current 
employer and its square, performing unpaid overtime, being a supervisor, log firm size, 
having changed employer in the last two year, having changed the job at the current 
employer, having a permanent position, having small children at home, gender and marital 
status, log hours worked, percentage women in an occupation and having a managerial or 
professional occupation, a supportive occupation or a productive occupation.
A shortcoming of the dataset is that I only have after tax wages and not before tax 
wages. Because the taxes affect wages of partners differently, the same before tax wage can 
lead to different after tax wages, women paying fewer taxes than men do within the same 
household.  To see how the analyses are affected by using the after tax wage I also analyse 
before tax hourly wages which are available for the years 1994, 1996 and 1998. The before 
tax wages are not available for the eighties and therefore cannot be used to present a long-
term trend. However if the before tax wage gap declines then also the after tax wage gap 
should decline and probable even more.
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The descriptive statistics of the data are presented in table 1. To save space I present 
only the descriptive statistics of 1985 and 1998. It can be seen that almost all variables show 
a significant difference between men and women, except for internal job change (in every 
year) and education since 1988. So in all years men attain higher job levels, are more 
experienced, have more tenure, perform more often unpaid overtime, are more often 
supervisors, work in larger firms, change less often employers, have more often 
indeterminate contracts, have more often children, are more often married, work longer 
hours, work less often in female dominated occupations, have less often a supportive 
occupation but more often an productive occupation and about equally often a managerial or 
professional occupation. Men earn higher wages and the absolute difference in wages 
between men and women increased with a quarter of a Dutch guilder (fl 0.27) but the 
relative wage difference (gross gender wage gap) decreased from 20 log points to 17 log 
points, that is with 3 log points.
The men score better on the characteristics that I expect to have a positive effect on 
the wage. So these differences suggest that the gender wage gap can be explained to a large 
extent by productivity differences. I know that wages increase with education and job level, 
that supervisors earn higher wages than non-supervisors, that large employers pay better 
wages than small employers etc. On almost all of these productive characteristics men 
outperform women, so this should contribute to the explanation of the gender wage gap of 
about twenty per cent. What strikes at first sight is the small decrease in the gross or 
unadjusted gender wage gap between 1985 and 1998. I see that the wage gap falls with only 
three log points. The absolute wage gap even increased in this thirteen-year period, which is 
very remarkable given the disappearance of other gender differences on the Dutch labour 
market.
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4 Results
Table 2 contains the results of the men’s wage equation. To save space I only present the 
results for 1985, 1998 and the panel analyses. I see that the rate of return on education 
increased from two and a half percent in 1985 to four and a half per cent in 1998, with a 
panel estimate of three1 per cent. A higher job level increases the wage with approximately 2 
per cent and the highest wage is earned when a man has acquired somewhere between thirty 
eight years and forty years of experience. Actually this means that men earn their highest 
wage just shortly before they retire. Although the effect is curve linear the wage peaks just 
before retirement, which is for almost everyone mandatory at age 65. Surprisingly, the years 
of experience at the current employer do not contribute to the wage, so one could say that 
men do not invest in firm specific human capital.
Men performing unpaid overtime receive six per cent higher wages than men not 
performing unpaid overtime. This effect is larger than the effect of being a supervisor, which 
raises wages with four per cent. Wages also increase with firm size. Changing employers or 
changing jobs at the current employer does not affect wages. The panel analysis shows even 
a decrease in wage after a change of employer. This change can be preceded by 
unemployment. Men having an indeterminate contract earn eight per cent more than men 
working on other contracts. Children do not affect the wages of the men whereas marital 
status does. Married men earn a ten per cent higher wage than unmarried men. Part-time 
workers earn more than full-time workers, which could be caused by the progressive tax 
system of the Dutch. The wages of the men are hardly affected by the percentage of women 
working in the same occupation. This implies that the wages of the men are not affected by 
crowding. Professionals and managers (white collar) earn higher wages than supportive and 
productive workers, although the productive workers earn the lowest wages.
1
 Differences between educational levels are two to three years of schooling. So obtaining a higher 
educational degree increases wages with somewhere between six and nine per cent.
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The results for the women show some remarkable differences to that of the men. The 
rate of return on education does not show the increase as it does for men, although the panel 
estimate for men and women is the same three per cent. The effect of job level is twice as 
high as that of the men. The effect of general experience seems to be less steep than for men, 
but women reach there earning peak earlier then men, needing only thirty-six years of 
experience. Contrary to the men tenure has a positive effect on women’s wages, making the 
combined age earning profile equally steep. This effect might be caused by the imprecise 
measure of experience as years since leaving full-time education.
The effect of unpaid overtime is only half the effect of men and women do not get 
paid for being a supervisor. The effect of working in large firms does not differ between men 
and women. Contrary to men an internal job change appears to have a positive effect on 
women’s wages (according to the panel analyses) and having children to take care of 
decreases their wage (according to the panel analyses). Marital status does not affect 
women’s wages, but the difference between part-time and full-time workers is bigger than 
for men, part-timers having a higher after tax wage than full-timers. The crowding of women 
in occupations has a negative effect on their wages. If women would be distributed over the 
occupations like men, their wages would increase by two per cent. The type of work carried 
out does not seem to affect women’s wages; I do not see a difference between managerial 
workers, professionals, supportive and productive workers. 
On basis of the wage equations I can expect that part of the gross gender wage gap is 
explained by price differences. Some of the effects favour women and some of the effects 
favour men. How the gross gender wage gap is decomposed is presented in table 4.
In table 4 I see that the gender wage gap hardly changed between 1985 and 1998 and 
is approximately nineteen log points. The year 1986 seems to be an outlier because the wage 
differential is much higher than in 1985 or 1988 and it is the only year in which both men 
and women are underpaid. Most strikingly is that the gender wage gap is not explained by 
productivity differences between men and women, despite the differences in productive 
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characteristics (see table 1). The productivity differences narrow the gap with no more than 
four log points for every single year. This means that less than twenty per cent of the wage 
differential is explained by the productivity differences between men and women and that 
the remaining unexplained gap is approximately sixteen log points, which is fairly high. 
Although the remaining difference is comparable with the estimates for other countries (cf.
Blau and Kahn, 2000; Hayfron, 2003) and numerous other studies, the effect attributed to 
productivity differences is low. 
This inability of the productive characteristics to explain the Dutch gender wage gap 
can be shown in another way. Estimation of a pooled male-female wage equation shows 
strong gender effects even after controlling for the productivity measures. The effect of the 
gender dummy, before and after inclusion of the control variables is shown in table 5. The 
gender effect decreases with approximately four log points after controlling for various 
characteristics. This is much less than the estimate of the Dutch Labour Inspectorate 
(Hoeben and Venema, 2004) who reduces the gender effect in the profit sector with fifteen 
percentage points, after controlling for several characteristics. 
So I have to conclude that the Dutch gender wage gap is explained by price 
differences between men and women and not by productivity differences. However it is not 
certain that these price differences are completely caused by discrimination (Chiplin, 1981), 
although the differences are that large that discrimination cannot be ruled out. Table 4 shows 
that men are overpaid, somewhere up to seven log points, and that women are underpaid, 
somewhere between eight and twenty log points. These results look robust and stable 
throughout the years. 
In these cross-sections I cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity, which might 
explain the large unexplained difference between men and women. However, the panel 
estimates also show a large unexplained wage differential between men and women (see 
table 4). The panel estimates show a productivity advantage of women of about ten log 
points, which is opposite to the estimate for Norway (Hayfron, 2003), and a large 
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underpayment of women of approximately thirty-five log points. So controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity worsens the picture, seen through the eyes of the women, instead 
of improving it. Women are even worse of than one would think based on the cross sections. 
Also the men are slightly underpaid by approximately six log points. 
Although I stratified on period in the panel analyses to control for labour market 
differences in the various years, it might be better to divide the panel into two sub samples, 
one containing the eighties and a second one containing the nineties. One reason to do so is 
that I miss observations for the years 1990 and 1992. Another reason is that the Netherlands 
experienced a short but deep recession in 1993, which restructured the labour market. 
Because of this recession effects and gender differences might have changed. Besides that in 
this way I get two estimates, one for each decade, of the gender wage gap controlled for 
unobserved heterogeneity. I present the results of these analyses in tables 4 and 5.
Between the eighties and the nineties the gender gap hardly decreased. I find a difference of 
two log points, which isn’t much and need not be statistically significant. However, I find a 
decrease in the underpayment of women by seventeen log points, but an increase in the 
overpayment of men with sixteen log points. There is no change in productivity differences 
between the eighties and the nineties. Also if I look at the controlled and uncontrolled 
gender effect for the eighties and the nineties I hardly see a decrease in the effect. The 
uncontrolled effect decreased with one log point, from twenty to nineteen and the controlled 
effect increased with one log point, from twenty-two to twenty-three. Remarkably the 
controlled effect is larger than the uncontrolled effect in both periods, reflecting the 
productivity advantage of the employed women.
To see how sensitive these results are for hours worked, cohorts and the use of after
tax wages I did some additional analyses. First I compared the gender before tax wage gap 
between full-time working men and women in the nineties. The gross before wage gap for 
the full-time workers (twenty-eight log points) is higher than the gross wage gap of all 
workers (twenty-four log points). However the controlled effect is much smaller, sixteen log 
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points versus twenty-two log points. So a large part of the wage differences are explained by 
working full-time or part-time. Because most of the women work part-time this might 
explain why the wage gap has hardly narrowed (Van Vuuren, 2004). 
Furthermore the gender wage gap is for the younger cohorts much smaller than for the 
entire sample, this holds both for the eighties and for the nineties. The after tax wage gap is 
approximately twelve log points and declined with only one and a half log point between the 
eighties and nineties. The controlled and uncontrolled before tax wage gap in the nineties is 
only thirteen log points. As for the complete sample differences in productive characteristics 
do not account for the wage gap. Human capital theory would predict that the smaller gap 
for younger workers is not a cohort effect but a career effect and that therefore the wage 
differences, also for these younger cohorts, will become larger in later stages of their careers. 
However, for the complete sample I did not find significant differences between the age-
earning profiles of men and women. The combined effect of experience and tenure is the 
same for men and women. This indicates that the wage gap for this younger cohort will not 
become as large as it is for the older cohorts now, unless women experience more breaks in 
their career than men. In our sample women have less experience and tenure than men, 
which would be the cause for the gender wage gap. But nowadays I see that Dutch women 
stay longer and longer on the labour market. In the seventies they withdrew from the labour 
market after marriage, in the eighties after the birth of the first child and now they seem to 
continue participation even after the birth of the first child, although they appear to reduce 
the hours worked. 
I see that the before tax gender wage gap is larger than the after tax wage gap, 
approximately five log points. A larger part of the before tax gender wage gap is explained 
by productivity differences than the after tax wage gap. This difference between the before 
and after tax wage gap is due to the differences in taxes. Because men earn higher wages 
they pay more taxes which declines the after tax wage gap. Although before and after tax 
wages lead to a different estimate of the wage gap, the trend is the same. There is no 
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convergence in men’s and women’s wages in the Netherlands. These findings differ from 
the before tax wages as published by Statistics Netherlands on their web site. The gender 
wage gap calculated on basis of the published wages by Statistics Netherlands is twenty-
seven log points in 1995, twenty-five log points in 1998 and decreased further to twenty-one 
in 2003. Unfortunately, I do not yet have the data for 2000 and 2002 of the OSA panel.
5 Summary and conclusion
In this paper I try to answer the question whether the gender wage gap in the Netherlands is 
declining. I posed this question because on several other indicators labour market differences 
between men and women in the Netherlands declined or disappeared altogether. Also 
researchers in other countries found a decline in the gender wage gap, especially in the USA. 
I have several reasons to believ  that the gender wage gap is declining. First of all the labour 
market participation of women has increased and women on the labour market are no longer 
a small minority. Second, the difference in productive characteristics between men and 
women is disappearing. For example, nowadays working women have the same level of 
education as working men. Also Becker’s model of ‘taste for discrimination’ predicts that in 
competitive markets the tastes do not hold and will disappear. In the Netherlands both 
product and labour markets have become increasingly competitive, due to changes in 
regulation like anti-trust laws, which should have an effect on the gender wage gap.
Contrary to these expectations I did not find a declining gender wage gap. The data in 
the OSA labour supply panel show a steady gender gap of approximately twenty per cent. 
Despite significant differences in productive characteristics between men and women these 
differences do not explain the gender wage gap. At most six log points of the total gap, that 
is twenty-five to thirty per cent of the gap, can be explained by productivity differences. 
Some of the characteristics favour men and some of the characteristics favour women, 
cancelling out the total effect. The largest part of the gender wage gap is due to ‘price’ 
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differences. Men are slightly overpaid, whereas women are to a larger extent underpaid. 
Both the cross-section analyses and the panel analyses give about the same answer. 
However, data from Statistics Netherlands suggests that after 1998 the gender wage gap in 
the Netherlands has declined with one log point per year.
I do find smaller differences between the young than between the older men and 
women. Combined with the same age-earning profile this could lead to smaller wage 
differences in the future, especially since women nowadays tend to withdraw less often from 
the labour market, due to marriage or children, then they did ten or twenty years ago. 
However, Van Vuuren (2004) predicts that by an increasing income inequality, as is 
the case in the Netherlands, and an increase in labour market participation of women the 
gender wage gap will increase, because women will enter the medium and low paying jobs 
whereas men enter all jobs, including the higher paying ones. The increase in income 
inequality is caused by an increase in the top-level incomes and not so much by a decrease 
of the lower incomes.
Although in some other countries the gender wage gap declined in all countries where 
the wage gap is investigated this gap is persistent. The question still remains if the 
unexplained differences are the result of discrimination against women. The differences in 
price effects, according to the Oaxaca and Ransom decomposition, suggest that at least some 
part of the gap is caused by labour market discrimination. However one should not jump to 
conclusions. For instance, Wielers and Van der Meer (2003) show that women prefer part-
time work above full-time work and full-time work above no work, whereas men have a 
preference for full-time work. 
These differences in preferences could lead to differences in wages. The more so 
because it is unlikely that both members of the household will work full-time, according to 
Becker’s theory of household labour division. So women will invest in different types of 
human capital than men. This human capital will have a lower rate of return on the labour 
market, causing persistent wage differentials between men and women. 
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The gender difference in preferences also leads to a segregated labour market with 
typical male and female jobs, where women are crowded in fewer jobs than men, despite the 
increase in labour market participation. This crowding could cause lower wages. It is well 
documented that female jobs pay less than male jobs.  Also women might have different 
preferences for job amenities accepting jobs that pay lower wages, because they have 
favourable job amenities, and thus receive less compensating wage differentials than men 
do. Men work to earn a family income whereas women work to increase social approval and 
less for the money.
However, we did control for the percentage of women in occupations and also that did 
not contribute much to the explanation of the gender wage gap. So we have to look in other 
directions for explanations. One possible direction is to look at incentive theories. Lazear 
(1998) shows that employers have the choice to offer jobs with strong incentives and thus 
higher wages and to offer jobs with only weak incentives and thus lower wages. If men are 
more committed to the labour market or to employers than women, men will choose for the 
high incentive jobs and high incentive employers. Although they have to work harder they 
feel they are compensated for their extra effort by the higher wages. In the available data it is 
very difficult to control for the differences in incentive structures, which might lead to the 
gender wage gap.
Besides segregation on the labour market it explains the gender wage gap, its 
persistence and the steeper age-earning profiles of men. Contrary to Becker’s taste for 
discrimination the gender wage gap did not fall over time and did not fall with an increase in 
labour market participation of women in the Netherlands. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation)
1985 1998
men women men women
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Education 11.35 3.10 11.01 3.08 12.38 2.49 12.33 2.32
Job level 3.82 1.67 3.44 1.36 4.16 1.65 3.90 1.51
experience 26.51 10.53 22.71 11.18 27.64 10.25 25.24 10.51
experience Sq. 813.4 625.3 640.7 601.6 869.2 586.4 747.6 573.9
Tenure 10.97 9.03 6.67 5.43 11.82 9.68 8.13 7.19
Tenure Sq. 201.7 309.3 74.0 133.1 233.5 313.4 117.8 180.6
Unpaid overtime 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.38 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44
supervisor 0.40 0.49 0.18 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.20 0.40
Log firm size 4.73 1.76 4.51 1.82 4.49 1.71 4.26 1.77
change of employer 0.26 0.44 0.37 0.48 0.18 0.39 0.28 0.45
internal job change 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Indeterminate contract 0.92 0.27 0.87 0.34 0.92 0.28 0.86 0.35
children 0.65 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.52 0.50
unmarried 1.13 0.34 1.31 0.46 1.18 0.39 1.24 0.43
Log (hours worked) 3.66 0.14 3.29 0.46 3.60 0.14 3.21 0.39
Percentage women 18.31 22.62 62.99 28.88 31.13 25.95 61.57 22.24
supportive workers 0.28 0.45 0.64 0.48 0.27 0.44 0.56 0.50
productive workers 0.42 0.49 0.07 0.25 0.38 0.49 0.05 0.22
Log (real wage) 2.54 0.30 2.34 0.28 2.71 0.36 2.54 0.31
Real wage 13.30 4.60 10.82 3.65 15.99 6.39 13.25 4.16
Number of cases 1232 547 1367 956
Source: OSA labour supply panel, own calculations.
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Table 2. Regression results of log (wage) for men 1985, 1998 and panel 1985-1998
1985 1998 Panel
Parameter s.d. Parameter s.d. Parameter s.d.
Education 0.026 0.002 0.045 0.003 0.029 0.001
Job level 0.026 0.006 0.027 0.006 0.018 0.002
experience 0.033 0.003 0.034 0.004 0.042 0.002
experience Sq.*100 -0.042 0.006 -0.041 0.006 -0.051 0.003
Tenure 0.000 0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.001
Tenure Sq.*100 0.001 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.003
Unpaid overtime 0.064 0.015 0.093 0.015 0.058 0.005
supervisor 0.086 0.013 0.041 0.014 0.034 0.004
Log firm size 0.009 0.003 0.020 0.004 0.009 0.002
change of employer 0.042 0.021 -0.045 0.022 -0.022 0.006
internal job change -0.011 0.017 0.002 0.021 -0.007 0.006
Indeterminate contract 0.115 0.024 0.122 0.026 0.060 0.008
children 0.040 0.015 -0.014 0.016 -0.005 0.006
unmarried -0.050 0.020 -0.136 0.020 -0.067 0.009
Log (hours worked) -0.525 0.044 -0.384 0.044 -0.639 0.015
percentage women *100 -0.079 0.033 -0.033 0.027 -0.014 0.010
supportive workers -0.032 0.021 -0.017 0.020 -0.014 0.007
productive workers -0.133 0.024 -0.065 0.023 -0.065 0.008
Constant 3.389 0.176 2.686 0.178 3.794 0.069
adj R2 0.545 0.597 0.564
s.e. 0.202 0.227 0.216
N 1232 1367 5811
Source: OSA labour supply panel, own calculations.
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Table 3. Regression results of log (wage) for women 1985, 1998 and panel 1985-1998
1985 1998 Panel
Parameter s.d. Parameter s.d. Parameter s.d.
Education 0.032 0.004 0.030 0.004 0.031 0.002
Job level 0.050 0.011 0.071 0.008 0.045 0.004
experience 0.036 0.005 0.024 0.004 0.030 0.002
experience Sq.*100 -0.055 0.008 -0.034 0.007 -0.040 0.004
Tenure 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.008 0.002
Tenure Sq.*100 0.000 0.021 -0.022 0.014 -0.013 0.007
Unpaid overtime 0.056 0.027 0.029 0.017 0.023 0.009
supervisor 0.002 0.027 -0.019 0.019 0.010 0.009
Log firm size 0.014 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.002
change of employer 0.036 0.034 0.027 0.022 0.007 0.010
internal job change 0.053 0.032 -0.009 0.024 0.031 0.010
Indeterminate contract 0.041 0.031 0.080 0.024 0.055 0.012
children -0.002 0.026 -0.008 0.019 -0.027 0.010
unmarried 0.002 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.015 0.011
Log (hours worked) -0.074 0.027 -0.129 0.022 -0.155 0.012
percentage women *100 -0.062 0.038 -0.075 0.036 -0.043 0.018
supportive workers -0.004 0.029 -0.018 0.022 -0.027 0.012
productive workers -0.038 0.052 -0.052 0.044 -0.039 0.024
Constant 1.459 0.131 1.826 0.107 1.904 0.070
adj R2 0.391 0.49 0.485
s.e. 0.221 0.22 0.218
N 547 956 2779.000
Source: OSA labour supply panel, own calculations.
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Table 4 The gender wage gap and its decomposition
gross 
wage gap
overpayment 
of men
underpayment 
of women
productivity 
differences
1985 0.202 0.002 0.161 0.039
1986 0.248 -0.162 0.385 0.025
1988 0.180 -0.036 0.215 0.001
1994 0.187 0.077 0.083 0.028
1996 0.193 0.004 0.162 0.027
1998 0.169 0.004 0.166 -0.002
Panel estimate, after tax 0.187 -0.065 0.347 -0.095
Panel estimate, 80's after tax 0.203 -0.142 0.399 -0.053
Panel estimate, 90's after tax 0.185 0.019 0.223 -0.058
Panel estimate, before tax 0.242 0.014 0.212 0.016
1994, before tax 0.241 0.058 0.104 0.080
1996, before tax 0.235 -0.052 0.240 0.047
1998, before tax 0.247 0.026 0.182 0.039
Source: OSA labour supply panel, own calculations.
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Table 5. The controlled and uncontrolled gender effect 
after tax hourly wage before tax hourly wage
uncontrolled controlled uncontrolled controlled
1985 -0.202 -0.125
1986 -0.248 -0.199
1988 -0.180 -0.145
1994 -0.187 -0.140 -0.241 -0.146
1996 -0.193 -0.150 -0.235 -0.171
1998 -0.169 -0.150 -0.247 -0.200
Panel estimate, 80's and 
90's -0.209 -0.241
Panel estimate, 80's -0.200 -0.220
Panel estimate, 90's -0.188 -0.230 -0.241 -0.217
Panel estimate, full-time -0.242 -0.139
Panel, estimate, 80's 
fulltime -0.236 -0.143
Panel estimate, 90's 
fulltime -0.228 -0.153 -0.279 -0.163
Panel estimates, 80's 
younger than 35 -0.125 -0.119
Panel estimates, 90's 
younger than 35 -0.110 -0.134 -0.140 -0.126
Source: OSA labour supply panel, own calculations.
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